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Abstract 
A critical knowledge governance problems concern the consequences the use of the 
governance mechanism of authority if the knowledge that is essential in a work setting is 
partially unknown to the person who is to exercise authority.  Is it possible to rationally 
direct work and activities under such conditions? Recently, many scholars have given 
negative answers to this question, arguing that authority relations are becoming strained 
by the increasingly distributed nature of knowledge in and between firms. We analyze 
this argument, providing definitions of “authority” and “distributed knowledge.” This 
allows us to show that ⎯ while intuitively appealing ⎯ the argument that authority 
cannot be an efficient coordination mechanism in the presence of distributed knowledge 
is at best problematic. The argument is based on the flawed inference that because the 
holder of authority is ignorant about some of the knowledge held by employees, he 
cannot rationally direct them. However, it is correct that the quality of centralized 
direction (planning, authority) may be compromised by distributed knowledge, leading 
to choices of other governance mechanisms and structures.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Much existing thinking on management and authority in organizations implicitly or explicitly 
makes strong assumptions about the knowledge held by managers. Thus, it is assumed that 
managers are at least as knowledgeable about relevant tasks as employees; that they can instruct 
the latter to carry out the tasks, and that they can somehow ascertain whether employees are 
sufficiently skilled to adequately carry out the task (Grandori, 1997; Sharma, 1997). It is, 
however, not clear what are the consequences for our understanding of management and 
authority if the knowledge that is essential in a work setting is partially unknown to the manager, 
distributed across several employees, and perhaps even ⎯ because of its tacit nature ⎯ must 
remain unknown? In particular, how can the manager rationally direct work under such 
conditions, that is, when he would seem to lack the knowledge required to instruct and monitor 
employees? Can the use of managerial authority give rise to an effective utilization of the 
knowledge held individually by employees?   
 It is quickly seen that although this problem may arguably have been exacerbated by the 
knowledge conditions that accompany the emergence of the knowledge economy ⎯ specifically 
an increased need to source outside knowledge, rely on knowledge workers and engage in 
distributed innovation processes⎯, it is a very general one.  It is hinted at, but not analyzed, by 
writers such as Cyert and March (1963) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) in the organization 
field and Hayek (1973) in political economy. In spite of its apparent relevance (cf. Lessard and 
Zaheer, 1996), the issue of the knowledge-based limits to management has attracted rather little 
interest from management theorists (for exceptions, see Mintzberg, 1985; Sharma, 1996; 
Grandori, 1997; Brusoni, 2005), emerging more indirectly under the guise of the knowledge-
based boundaries to the firm (e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1992). Indeed, as Lessard and Zaheer 
(1996: 513) indicate, the issue is usually sidetracked or at least black-boxed.1 
 The purpose of this chapter is to address a subset of the overall issue, namely the 
implications of “distributed knowledge” for the use in firms of the authority relation. The notion 
of distributed knowledge, coined in computer science about two decades ago (Halpern and Moses 
                                                 
1 They provide strategic management as an example: “In strategy research, the issue of the expertise for strategic 
decision-making being spread across the firm is often assumed away by focusing exclusively on decision-making by 
the CEO or the top management team” (Lessard and Zaheer, 1996: 513). 
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1990), has fast become a household concept in various branches of management and organization 
studies (e.g., Marengo, 1995; Cohen and Regan, 1996; Tsoukas, 1996; Lessard and Zaheer, 1996; 
Gherardi, 1999; Coombs and Metcalfe, 2000; Larsen, 2001; Potts, 2001; Spangler and Peters, 
2001. For the moment, think of “distributed knowledge” as knowledge that is not possessed by 
any single mind, but “belongs to” a group of interacting agents, somehow emerges from the 
aggregation of the (possibly tacit) knowledge elements of the individual agents, and can be 
mobilized for productive purposes.   
 Many writers have argued that such distributed knowledge is becoming increasingly 
important in an innovation-rich, knowledge-based economy. This is because firms increasingly 
need to rely on a growing number of knowledge specialists, be they employees or outside 
knowledge agents, such as supplier firms or universities (e.g., Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt, 1997; 
Hodgson, 1998; Coombs and Metcalfe, 2000; Smith, 2000; Wang and von Tunzelman, 2000; 
Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt, 2001, Orlikowski, 2002; Husted and Michailova, this volume). This 
tendency is seen as having strong transformative implications for the boundaries of the firm 
(Coombs and Metcalfe, 2000), as well as for internal organization (Cowen and Parker, 1997; 
Foss, 1999) ⎯ including the use of authority as a mechanism of coordination (Grandori, 1997, 
2002).2   
 However, although the concept of distributed knowledge is often invoked, and rather far-
reaching claims are made on its behalf, there is little systematic analysis of how distributed 
knowledge and economic organization relate. Thus, the concept is not clearly defined in the 
management literature, the causal links from distributed knowledge to economic organization are 
unclear, and an overall perspective that can frame the discussion is missing. In contrast, we 
proffer a definition and examine links, focusing on the relation between distributed knowledge 
and the use of authority in firms. We embed our arguments in the knowledge governance 
approach (Foss, 2007; Foss, Husted and Michailova, 2008; see also the Introduction to this 
volume), that is, we examine the alignment between (the characteristics of) knowledge (i.e., 
                                                 
2 By “coordination,” we mean consistency of plans.  By “coordination mechanisms,” we refer to those mechanisms 
that may assure such plan-consistency, such as prices, authority, norms/rules/routines/standards/focal points (i.e., 
mechanisms that are based on behavioral regularities), consultation and ratiocination (e.g., in games).  For an 
excellent discussion of coordination mechanisms and their implications for organizational theory, see Grandori 
(2001).     
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distributed knowledge) and governance mechanisms (i.e., authority) in the context of an overall 
efficiency perspective.  
 Here is how we proceed: We begin by taking a closer look at the key constructs of 
“authority” and “distributed knowledge.” We then examine their interplay, focusing particularly 
of the role of authority as a mechanism of coordination when knowledge is distributed (see also 
Anna Grandori’s chapter in this volume). An outcome of this discussion is that how well 
authority performs under these conditions depends on what we mean by authority. Thus, while 
the narrow notions of authority associated with Coase (1937) and Simon (1951) may indeed in 
certain cases (i.e., for certain specifications of distributed knowledge) be compromised by 
distributed knowledge, this does not imply that all manifestations of authority break down as 
mechanisms of coordination when knowledge is distributed. There is accordingly a need for a 
more fine-grained understanding of types of managerial authority, and we take steps in this 
direction. We end by exploring the conditions under which authority may be an efficient 
mechanism of coordination under distributed knowledge, relying on ideas on problem-solving 
(Simon, 1962, 1973; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004 and their chapter in this volume) and on 
organizational economics. Thus, in addition to conceptual analysis, this chapter contributes the 
kind of “feasibility” study recommended by Grandori (2002), that is, a relatively detailed, mainly 
theoretical, exploration of the working of a specific governance mechanism in the context of 
those knowledge conditions that are often taken to characterize our emerging knowledge 
economy.  
 
AUTHORITY AND DISTRIBUTED KNOWLEDGE: DEBATE AND DEFINITIONS 
Setting the Stage: Distributed Knowledge and Economic Organization 
 Return to the question with which we began this chapter: How is it possible rationally to 
govern activities, such as work activities carried out by employees, by means of the authority 
mechanism when the holder of authority is partially ignorant about some, and potentially much, 
of the knowledge possessed by the employees, knowledge that may be vital for carrying out the 
relevant activities?  
 This question is a subset of a broader question on the role of centralized resource allocation 
in social systems where the central authority is, to a certain extent, ignorant of knowledge held by 
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individual agents. In this broader formulation, the question harks back to debate on the viability 
and efficiency of planned resource allocation on the societal level (i.e., socialism) that raged 
among academic economists in (particularly) the inter-war period (Lavoie, 1985). Hayek (1945) 
famously argued that any economy-wide manager ⎯  a central planner ⎯  would be inherently 
constrained by the distributed (or “dispersed”) and tacit nature of knowledge in the economy. 
Planning confronted inherent knowledge-based constraints. In fact, Hayek argued, these 
constraints were binding at such a small scale of economic activity that comprehensive overall 
management/planning of economy-wide resource allocation would be deeply inefficient. 
However, he did not provide serious micro-foundations for this argument.  
 Though little systematic thinking exists on the issue in management, we can see the 
Hayekian idea popping up in many different contexts. For example, many of Mintzberg’s (e.g., 
1990) critiques of “design” and “planning” in the strategic management process invoked Hayek-
like arguments, such as the notion that emergent strategies would be able to mobilize much more 
locally held knowledge than a centralized strategy process.  
 In a different context, Langlois (1995) explicitly links thinking on firm capabilities to 
Hayekian arguments: Since firms as planned entities are inherently limited in the extent to which 
they can absorb, process and utilize knowledge ⎯ an idea that is reflected in the notion of 
“capability” ⎯ there are knowledge-based limits to the size and scope of firms. Related 
reasoning can be found in Kogut and Zander (1992), Grant (1996), and other knowledge-based 
papers that link firm-level knowledge and economic organization. Again, this literature may be 
criticized for lacking micro-foundations: Because the argument is not systematically rooted in a 
theory of (individual-level) cognition, it remains unclear why exactly the size and scope of firms 
are constrained by capabilities.   
 As a final example consider the increasingly prevalent argument, forcefully put forward by 
Grandori (2002: 257), that “[d]istributed knowledge causes authority (as a centralized decision-
making system) to fail in all its forms.” Similar statements can be found in, for example, Minkler 
(1993), Cowen and Parker (1997), Hodgson (1998), and Radner (2000). The reasoning behind the 
arguments seems to be as follows. First, it is argued that authority ⎯ that is, the right to make 
decisions which guide the decisions of another person (Coase 1937; Simon 1951, 1991) ⎯ 
presupposes considerable knowledge about the knowledge (and perhaps also the action set) that is 
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available to those that are being directed. Second, the presence of distributed knowledge means 
that this condition cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, authority is an inefficient coordination 
mechanism, and alternative coordination mechanisms (Grandori, 2001) emerge to handle the 
coordination task implied by distributed knowledge, such as prices (Hayek, 1945; Cowen and 
Parker, 1997), communication (Garicano, 2000), and norms (Grandori, 1997, 2002).
 These examples hopefully suffice to indicate the following: First, scholars from different 
disciplines and fields put forward arguments that the distributed nature of knowledge in social 
systems is an independent constraint on the efficiency of planning/central management/authority. 
In particular, authority is argued to be an inefficient means of coordination under conditions of 
distributed knowledge. Second, the specific mechanisms through which the distributed’ness of 
knowledge constrains planning/central management/authority are not identified (the exception is 
Grandori; see Grandori, 1997). Three, the arguments are implicitly critiques of those 
organizational theories that place emphasis on the authority relation as the mechanism of 
coordination that primary characterizes firms, notably transaction cost theories (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1985) and property rights theory (Hart, 1995, 1996).  Finally, it is fair to say that most 
of those writers who have argued that distributed knowledge is a force that impacts economic 
organization have generally failed to precisely define what is meant by knowledge being 
“distributed.” Similarly, other key constructs, notably that of “authority,” are seldom defined and 
implicitly taken to be unproblematic. They are not, as we shall see. Thus, in order to assess 
arguments relating distributed knowledge to authority, we therefore need to look at these two key 
constructs in some detail. 
Authority 
 Organizational theories, drawing on sociology, economics, and psychology, present a huge 
number of interpretations of authority (e.g., Weber, 1947; Thompson, 1956; Grandori, 2001).  This 
is not the place to present a full review and critical evaluation of the multitude of definitions and 
ideas regarding the notion of authority. Rather, for the purpose of this chapter, the concepts of 
authority offered by Herbert Simon (1951, 1991) in two papers, separated by four decades, serve as 
useful starting points, because they are well known, precise, do not invite confusions with neighbor 
concepts (e.g., leadership), and are different.  In fact, we shall them as springboards for developing 
notions of “Type I” and “Type II Authority.”  
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 Type I Authority. Simon (1951) defines authority as obtaining when a “boss” is permitted by a 
“worker” to select actions, A0 ⊂ A, where A is the set of the worker’s possible behaviors. More or 
less authority is then defined as making the set A0 larger or smaller. Simon develops a multi-period, 
incomplete contracts model with ex post governance. In the first period, the prospective worker 
decides whether to accept employment or not. Both parties know the possible set of actions and their 
associated expected and real costs and benefits, but none of the parties know which actions will be 
optimal, given circumstances. In the next period, the relevant circumstances are revealed to the boss.  
The boss then picks the action that he prefers and directs the worker to that action which ⎯ for the 
latter to accept the assignment ⎯ must lie within his or her “zone of acceptance.”  
 A worker’s zone of acceptance is defined in Simon as that set of actions where the worker’s 
expected costs of carrying out these actions do not exceed the agreed-upon on wage. An important 
feature of authority is that the authority of a superior is constrained by the acceptance of the 
subordinate of the authority. “A subordinate may be said to accept authority,” Simon (1951: 22) 
explains, “… whenever he permits his behavior to be guided by a decision reached by another, 
irrespective of his own judgment as to the merits of that decision.”3 That is, for some of the actions 
the costs to the worker may exceed the agreed-on wage, but acceptance of authority implies that the 
worker carries out those actions irrespectively of his own cost of doing so.4  The boss cannot commit 
to choose actions that maximize total surplus, and even if the worker is able to identify actions that 
yield a higher total surplus, he must carry out the action that is preferred by the boss. However, the 
boss never includes in the zone of acceptance those actions where the expected increase in wage to 
the worker exceeds his expected increase in benefits.  
 Simon’s explanation of authority and the employment relation is quite akin to Coase’s  (1937). 
In the presence of uncertainty, Coase argues, contingencies are costly to anticipate and describe in 
advance, and rather than negotiating on a spot market basis over each contingency as they arise, an 
employment contract is concluded. The latter is defined as “… one whereby the factor, for a certain 
remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating) agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur 
                                                 
3 In contrast, in a market contract, the parties negotiate ex ante about the actions that the agent can take in response to 
various contingencies so as to fulfill the contract. Thus, the principal’s flexibility under market contracting is limited 
compared to what it would be under authority.  
4 This is what makes the authority different from an agency relation. In the latter, the agent’s participation constraint 
is never violated.  
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within certain limits. The essence of the contract is that it should only state the limits to the powers 
of the entrepreneur. Within these limits, he can therefore direct the other factors of production” 
(idem. 242). Simon and Coase’s understanding of authority is summarized in the following 
definition:  
Definition (Type I Authority): Authority is a decision right that an employer acquires, because 
he expects to obtain only ex post contracting the relevant information that will make it possible 
for him to pick his preferred actions within a specified subset of actions, which he will then 
direct the employee to carry out.   
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In the Simon notion of authority symmetric knowledge/information is consistent with the authority 
relation. It is sufficient that one contracting party stands to gain more than the other from picking the 
actions once contingencies materialize, and that the contractors cannot make side-payments that 
enable them to agree on what is the best choice when contingencies arise. In the Coase notion of 
authority the employer picks well-defined actions from a set of discrete actions (about which the 
employer has perfect information). He does this on the basis of knowledge about contingencies that 
is superior to that of the employee. However, it is key that in either case the employer formally 
grants no discretion with respect to the choice of actions.   
 Type II Authority. In actuality it is hard to imagine an authority relation where absolutely no 
discretion is granted to the employee. Even for the most closely monitored and repetitive work, 
some employee discretion will remain (Knight, 1921). Specifically, in the presence of costs of 
monitoring, the employer will grant de facto discretion to the employee. This already indicates that 
authority and employee discretion are not mutually exclusive.  This was clearly recognized by 
Simon (1991), four decades four decades after his paper on authority. Simon (1991: 31; our emph.) 
argues that “[a]uthority in organizations is not used exclusively, or even mainly, to command 
specific actions.” Instead, he explains, it is a command that takes the form of a result to be produced, 
a principle to be applied, or goal constraints, so that “[o]nly the end goal has been supplied by the 
command, and not the method of reaching it.”5   
 Delegation and authority. Two crucial aspects of this understanding of authority should be 
noted. First, relative to Simon’s earlier definition this notion of authority allows for the delegation of 
discretion. In a sense, this extension brings agency relations in hierarchies inside the orbit of 
authority relations, because it allows for the possibility that authority may (also) have the function of 
unilaterally changing the degree of delegation post contract agreement (see also Aghion and Tirole, 
1997; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1999). Second, this second, more expansive notion of authority 
does not presuppose that the employer is at least as knowledgeable as the employee about how to 
best carry out a task. That is, an employer is able to direct or constrain employee actions in ways that 
benefit him, while allowing the existence of and possible use of knowledge held only by the 
                                                 
5 In fairness to Simon, it should be noted that the more expansive notion of authority in the 1991 paper can be found 
already in Simon (1947).  Thus, Simon’s views of authority did not change between 1951 and 1991.  What arguably 
happened was that Simon in the 1951 paper developed a formal model of authority and that tractability of the formal 
analysis required that a relatively simple concept of authority be employed.  
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employee. To see how delegation and authority connect, consider the benefits and costs of 
delegation.  
 Employers grant discretion to employees for a number of reasons, including economizing 
with principals’ opportunity costs (Salanié, 1997), improving motivation through “empowerment” 
(Conger and Canungo, 1988), fostering learning by providing more room for local explorative 
efforts and improving collective decision-making by letting more employees have an influence on 
decisions (Miller, 1992). Importantly, delegation is also granted in order to make efficient use of 
distributed knowledge in firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1992).   
 There is also a cost side to delegation. In Simon (1951), the only restrictions in employment 
contracts are those that are defined by the agreed upon “zone of acceptance” since actions are all 
well defined... However, once delegation enters the employment relation the decision rights that 
are granted to employees are constrained in various ways. This brings a further function of 
authority into focus, namely to constrain “the method[s] of reaching” an end goal, in Simon’s 
(1991) terminology. Also, top-management keeps ultimate decision rights, so that it, if deemed 
necessary, can overrule decisions made on the basis of delegated decision rights (Baker, 
Gibbons, and Murphy, 1999).        
 There are several reasons why an employer may want to constrain the discretion they 
delegate to employees. Employees are not full owners or residual claimants on the results of their 
decisions or do not share all relevant knowledge. Thus, delegation produces spillover effects (i.e., 
“externalities”) that may be harmful to the employer and to overall firm performance.The 
relevant externalities include, but are by no means limited to, morally hazardous behavior 
(Holmström, 1979; Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). They also include coordination failures, 
such as scheduling problems, duplicative efforts (e.g., of information gathering, R&D, etc.), 
cannibalization of product markets and other instances of decentralized actions being inconsistent 
with the firm’s overall aims, etc. One way to reduce such harmful externalities is to constrain 
decision rights and monitor their use (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). 
Such monitoring may lead to overruling of decisions made on the basis of delegated rights.  
 This suggests a rationale for authority that is rather different from the one associated with 
Type I Authority but consistent with Simon (1991) ― namely, to delegate and constrain 
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discretion.6  For example, the right to use an asset in certain ways may be delegated; however, it 
is understood that this right does not entail the right to use the asset in the service of a competitor 
firm, nor may the asset be used in a way that management perceives as being damaging to the 
firm. It is also understood that breaking this understanding will be sanctioned.7 Defining 
constraints also implies the rights to veto decisions made on the basis of delegated rights, and to 
withdraw delegated decision rights (this may be seen as a special case of constraining rights). 
Employees may have different benefits and costs depending on the particular delegation and 
constraining of discretion. As in Type I Authority an agreed-upon “zone of acceptable delegation 
and constraining” limits the way in which authority can be exercised. As under Type I Authority 
the employer only includes actions where his expected benefits exceed his expected costs in 
terms of increased compensation to the employee. Given the above, we may put forward a 
second definition of authority: 
Definition (Type II Authority): Authority is a decision right that an employer acquires, 
because he expects to obtain only ex post contracting the relevant information that enable 
him to  delegate discretion to employees and constraining such discretion in ways 
preferred by him and within a specified subset of actions.  
In this definition, the holder of authority makes choices from a set of alternative possibilities of 
delegation. He does not necessarily have complete information about the actions available to the 
employee given the level of delegation and constraints he chooses. As we shall argue this directly 
means that Type II Authority can make efficient use of distributed knowledge. However, 
clarifying the latter notion still remains.  
Defining Distributed Knowledge 
 During the last decade or so the notion of distributed knowledge has been used with 
increasing frequency as a catchy description of the knowledge conditions in which modern firms 
                                                 
6 The rather considerable literature on delegation in organizations (e.g., Galbraith, 1974; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1992) does not explain why delegation should be associated with the exercise of authority.   
Part of the reason may lie in the static nature of the analysis: All costs and benefits associated with delegation are 
given (hence, optimum delegation is known immediately to decision-makers), and there is no role for authority, 
except than perhaps monitoring the use of delegated decision rights.   
7 Multi-tasking considerations (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) also suggest a basic reason why decision rights may 
be constrained; thus, agents’ attempts to carry out activities that are easily measured and therefore directly rewarded 
at the expense of harder to measure, but necessary activities may lead to the former ones being curtailed. 
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increasingly find themselves.8 Thus, in the strategy field, Tsoukas (1996) conceptualized the firm 
as a distributed knowledge system, Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt (1997) documented the 
increasing extent to which the knowledge bases controlled by major technology-intensive 
corporations are distributed, and Lessard and Zaheer (1996) discussed the implications of 
distributed knowledge for the strategy-making process. Hutchins (1995) and Gherardi (1999) 
discussed implications for organizational learning, Cohen and Regan (1996) applied the notion to 
technology management, Foss (1999) discussed implications for the modern economics of 
organization, and Larsen (2001) discussed the context in the context of knowledge-intensive 
service firms.  
 This scholarly activity may reflect reality. Thus, many writers argue that distributed 
knowledge conditions have become increasingly important in modern competitive conditions, as 
firms to a larger extent need to access an expanding set of external knowledge sources (Coombs 
and Metcalfe, 2000; Smith, 2000; Arora and Gambardella, 1994), and increasingly need to rely 
on specialist knowledge controlled and accumulated by specialist employees (Miles et al., 1997). 
Of course, there is nothing new per se in the notion that knowledge for productive purposes may 
be distributed; indeed, it is a necessary consequence of the combination of the division of labor 
and bounded rationality (Hayek, 1945, 1973; March and Simon, 1958; Arora and Gambardella, 
1994). Rather, what is being asserted by a number of authors seems to be that there are significant 
discontinuities in the evolution of distributed knowledge, so that the distributed character of 
knowledge has strongly increased during the last decades. Thus, Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt 
(1997) document the significantly increasing extent to which firms organize in-house distributed 
technological knowledge, drawn from a growing number of underlying technological disciplines. 
Wang and von Tunzelman (2000) emphasize that not only are the number of disciplines that 
firms draw on expanding, it is also the case that these disciplines themselves evolve in terms of 
their depth and specialization; firms’ sourcing of technological knowledge reflects this.  Although 
the construct thus seems to ring a bell in a number of contexts, the above contributions are not 
entirely forthcoming with respect to precise definitions.  
                                                 
8 To our knowledge, the term originates with Halpern and Moses (1990).  However, the basic idea has a much longer 
pre-history, not only in the logic of knowledge, but also in economics and political philosophy (e.g., Hayek, 1945, 
1973). 
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 Distributed knowledge is a member of a set of concepts that relate to the different ways in 
which knowledge may “belong” to a group of agents. Two other examples of this kind of 
concepts are the game theory notion of “common knowledge” and “shared knowledge.” An event 
is common knowledge among a group of players if each player knows it, each one knows that the 
other players know it, each player knows that other players know that the other players know it 
and so on (Aumann, 1976).9 Shared knowledge differs from common knowledge by not requiring 
that each agent knows that the other agents know, etc. Thus, there is shared knowledge of a fact if 
each agent knows this fact, but does not know that the other agents know it.    
 If common knowledge lies at one end of the spectrum, distributed knowledge lies at the 
other end. Loosely, knowledge is distributed when a set of agents knows something no single 
agent (completely) knows. Thus, the notions that firms (Tsoukas, 1996) or whole economies 
(Hayek, 1945, 1973) are distributed knowledge systems mean that the set of agents comprising 
these entities somehow can be said to collectively possess knowledge that no single agent 
possesses. Note that this does not amount to asserting the existence of mysterious supra-
individual “collective minds.” Knowledge still ultimately resides in the heads of individuals; 
however, when this knowledge is combined and “aggregated” in certain ways, it means that 
considered as a system, a set of agents possesses knowledge that they do not possess if separated.   
 To add a slightly formal touch to this, consider the following definition based on epistemic 
logic (Hintikka, 1962):   
Definition (Distributed Knowledge): If Kipi means that agent i knows proposition i, a set 
of n agents has distributed knowledge of a proposition q (i.e., Dq) when: K1p1 ∧ K2p2 ∧ … 
∧ Knpn ⇒ Dq,  q ≠ pi, ∀i.10    
For example, Jack knows that p is the case and Jill knows that p implies y, but neither know that 
y is the case.  However, if Jack and Jill’s knowledge states are “added” there is a sense, which is 
more than metaphorical, in which they may know that y is the case (Gerbrandy, 1998: 53). The 
information that y is the case is present in the system comprising Jack and Jill, but in a distributed 
form. The definition is clearly open to some interpretation. At one extreme, Jack and Jill may 
                                                 
9 Common knowledge is a core assumption in contract theory, including agency theory (Salanié 1997). 
10 pi could be interpreted as a vector of propositions. Thus, we are not asserting that each agent only knows one thing. 
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both be completely ignorant about the knowledge controlled by the other party.11 At the other 
extreme, there is considerable, but not complete,12 knowledge overlap (pi may be close in some 
sense to pj), but it is still the case that no single agent knows q. (An implication is that distributed 
knowledge is consistent with asymmetric information). Between the extremes are different 
degrees of overlap between individual knowledge elements. Note that as a special, but very 
important, case, it is not inconsistent with the definition to have agent i knowing that if the 
various knowledge of all the other agents are “added” in some activity, this will result in a 
beneficial outcome, even though he does not know any of these knowledge states, and may not 
even know the precise nature of the beneficial outcome.  
Distributed Knowledge as a Challenge to Authority? 
 In a paper that is quite forthcoming about the relation between authority and distributed 
knowledge, Grandori (1997: 35) argued that  
… whatever its basis, authority is a feasible governance mechanism only if 
information and competence relevant to solving economic action problems can be 
transferred to and handled by a single actor, a positive “zone of acceptance” exists, 
the actions of other supervised actors are observable, and if the system is not as large 
as to incur an overwhelming communication channel overload and control losses.  
Thus, Grandori nicely outline the reasons why distributed knowledge may challenge authority. 
Specifically, authority is challenged as a “feasible governance mechanism” for three reasons: 
Under distributed knowledge,  
1) the employer does not possess full knowledge of the employee’s action set (i.e., the 
actions that he can take when uncertainty is resolved), so that the employee can take actions 
about which the manager has no knowledge;  
2) the employee is better informed than the employer with respect to how certain actions 
should (optimally) be carried out; and  
                                                 
11 Sometimes such an interpretation is made of the “competitive equilibrium” model in economics: Although 
knowledge of technologies and preferences is private, all this knowledge is utilized in the best possible way, so that 
the knowledge of how to bring about an allocation of resources with superior welfare properties is distributed in the 
economy (Makowski and Ostroy, 2001). 
12 If knowledge overlap is complete, the agents will also know or be able to infer q (if they have perfect 
rationality/perfect reasoning assumptions and/or the knowledge elements and how they connect is easy to 
comprehend).   
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3) the employer does not know which actions should optimally be chosen from the action 
set in response to contingencies (because he lacks information on contingencies).   
The ignorance on the part of the employer that is implied by 1) to 3) implies that authority cannot 
be employed as an efficient mechanism of coordination. 
 While intuitively appealing, this argument is problematic, and may be a non sequitur. The 
reasons are these: first, the scope conditions of the argument seem unclear clear. We have argued 
that there are (at least) two meaningful notions of managerial authority (Type I and Type II). 
Does the argument apply to both notions of authority, or only two one of them (and then which 
one?)? Second, the argument is based on an inference that seems flawed, namely that because the 
holder of authority is ignorant about some of the knowledge held by employees, he just cannot 
rationally direct them. But in actuality managers are constantly engaged in directing employees 
whose knowledge in a number of dimensions is superior to theirs. Managers are often quite 
successful in this. The reason is that one can very well possess the knowledge that somebody 
else’s knowledge may be productively used in a certain activity, even though one doesn’t possess 
that knowledge oneself. Knight (1921) called this faculty “judgment” and argued that 
management is first and foremost about exercising judgment over worker capabilities.   
 As we shall argue, the problem is therefore not that matching authority and distributed 
knowledge is always and inherently inefficient. It is not. Rather, what needs to be examined is 
how distributed knowledge constrains the efficient exercise of authority. The issue is, in other 
words, not one of whether a governance mechanism is inherently inefficient, but about choices  
between governance mechanisms.  
 
ALIGNING DISTRIBUTED KNOWLEDGE AND TYPE I AUTHORITY 
An Example  
 To focus things, consider a contract situation between Jack and Jill. Knowledge in this 
situation is distributed, because while Jill has knowledge of some of elements and Jack has 
knowledge of other elements that are relevant to their contractual relation, their respective 
knowledge is not overlapping.  
 Specifically, Jack can execute two different actions, y and z. Because of specialization only 
Jack is capable of carrying out the actions. The two actions can solve coordination problems in 
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the contract situations. The costs and benefit of these actions depend on the contingencies (p, b, 
q) that arise with certain probabilities during the contractual relationship. See Table 1. The 
numbers in the cells show the expected benefit to the employer (Jill) from an action given a 
particular contingency and the expected costs to Jack of carrying out the actions under the three 
different contingencies.   
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Insert Table 1 Here 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
 The things that Jack and Jill can know and which are of relevance to their contractual 
relation (i.e., the “knowledge elements”) are 1) the actions available to Jack; 2) the costs and 
benefits of carrying out these actions (i.e., the implications of [p, b, q] on the choice between y 
and z); 3) the different ways in which the actions can be carried out; 4) their associated costs and 
benefits; 5) the type of contingencies that can arise (p, b, q); 6) the probability that these 
contingencies arise; and 7) the actual contingencies that have emerged. The coordination problem 
then consists of combining these knowledge elements in such a way that Jack chooses those 
actions that match the relevant contingencies in a value maximizing manner (given the various 
constraints that may exist).  
 In a perfect world with symmetric information, complete contingent contracts and/or with 
costless re-negotiation and contract enforcement, the problem would be easily solved, and all the 
value-maximizing actions would be chosen to match whatever contingency emerges. Recall that 
in Simon (1951), the assumption in a contracting situation as the one sketched above is that of 
symmetric information between the contracting parties on all relevant elements; however, the 
execution of the contract is characterized by uncertainty with respect to which one of the already 
identified contingencies arise during the contract execution phase. High contracting costs makes 
it too costly to re-negotiate as the contingencies emerge, and a third party cannot enforce a 
promise by the employer to choose only actions that maximize total surplus. Thus, the choice 
according to Simon is therefore between a market contract in which Jill and Jack contract on one 
of the known actions to be carried out independently of what contingency emerges, or an 
employment contract where the employer (Jill)  choose actions as contingencies emerge, that is, 
exercise Type I Authority.  
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 Given the specifications in Table 1, Jill will pick action y if contingency b emerges and 
action z if contingency p or q emerges. Given the assumed probabilities, the expected benefit to 
Jill of having authority is 112 and the expected cost to Jack 32, which is also the minimum flat 
wage he accepts for actions within this zone of acceptance (given that his opportunity costs are 
zero). The expected surplus from the authority relation is 80. In a market contract Jack and Jill 
would contract on y and the surplus would be 70. Thus, in a situation of symmetric information 
Jack and Jill strike an employment contract in which Jack executes y or z depending on the 
benefit of these actions to Jill given the observed contingencies.   
Contracting Under Distributed Knowledge 
 In the present context, knowledge is distributed when Jack and Jill have different sets of 
information on any of the above factors of importance to the contract. Will authority in the Type I 
sense be efficient under these conditions?  
 Consider first distributed knowledge about the actual or expected cost to the employee of 
the different actions under different contingencies (i.e., factor 2) above). If Jack is informed about 
his own cost of actions, but Jill is not, Jack can misrepresent the real costs in order to influence 
the sharing of the surplus. Such strategic misrepresenting can, of course, also happen in market 
contracts and there are no systematic differences in incentives to do so depending on the type of 
contract. Jack’s misrepresentation of costs may influence what actions Jill wants to include in the 
zone of acceptance, if she is to assume the role of employer. For this reason Jill may prefer a 
market contract rather than the employment contract she would have preferred in a setting of 
symmetric information.13   
 If there is distributed knowledge concerning the probability of a contingency, and Jill is the 
informed party, she can use this information strategically in both market and employment 
contract to extract a greater share of the surplus. Thus, Jill can misrepresent the probability of a 
contingency that make her choose actions that are costly to Jack. However, she does not stand to 
gain from misrepresenting beyond what makes Jack accept the same zone of acceptance as he 
would have accepted in a setting of symmetric information. 
                                                 
13 The same conclusion can be drawn if employees (agents) can act in a morally hazardous manner and choose to 
exert less effort in the actions they choose or that are chosen by the employer. The employment law often grants 
employers more rights to monitor the employee than is the case with a market contract. For that reason moral hazard 
may influence the choice of contract.  
 18 
 The consequences of distributed knowledge for the choice between employment and 
market contracts are more difficult to track if there is asymmetric information about the actions (y 
and z) available to Jack and if this information is obtained by Jack post contracting. Consider the 
situation in which Jill does not know that y is a solution to the coordination problem when 
contingency b arises. If she enters an employment contract, she picks y if contingency q arises 
and z in all other cases. Her surplus from entering that contract compared to the market contract 
(i.e., choosing z in all cases) is the difference between the wage and the created value from 
choosing y if contingency q arises ⎯ which may not be sufficient to make her choose the 
employment contract. Jack may not have incentives to inform Jill of these actions post 
contracting, since he is not interested in revealing actions where his costs are higher than the 
agreed upon fixed wage. Jack will not inform Jill about y as a contract solution should 
contingency q arise, but would do so should contingency p arise. However, neither the 
“employee” in a market contract has incentives to inform the “employer” on actions that imply 
large costs relative to the payment for the job. Thus, if the employee obtains information about 
actions post contracting (and this is expected by the employer), it can positively influence the use 
of employment contracts and authority only if the employer is able to take advantage of emergent 
actions where the costs to the employee are less than the agreed-upon wage without 
renegotiations.   
 Finally, the employment contract is always efficient compared to the market contract if 
there is symmetric information on the actions and factors that effect costs and benefits to the 
parties of entering the contract, but Jill is in a better position to observe what contingency 
materialize. A different situation obtains if Jill can observe the contingencies (p, b, q), but only 
Jack has the information on the actions available and on the costs and benefits of these actions. In 
that case, Jack must be given discretion to make efficient use of the information. 
 From the above discussion, it may seem that the efficiency gain from using an employment 
contract compared to a market contract can be ascribed to the employer being more sensitive to 
the choice of actions compared to the employee when it is too costly for an employer to credibly 
enforce a promise to select only actions that maximize joint output. The latter situation arises in 
one-period games when some information about the actual contingencies and/or the actions and 
their associated costs and benefits are not available to third parties (e.g. courts) allowing them to 
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enforce the promise. However, for the employment contract to be efficient, the employee must be 
able to commit to carry out actions that are not in his interest. How can that happen? For an 
employee to credible commit to authority, a third party must refuse to interfere with the contract 
execution during execution stages. This non-interference from a third party supports the use of 
authority in contracting relations (Williamson, 1993), and is efficient when contractual 
incompleteness arises because of asymmetrical information between an enforcing third party and 
the contracting parties. Moreover, courts allow employers to sanction employees who do not 
obey the authority of the employer. Courts can observe if an employee refuses to carry out any 
actions. In that case courts enforce authority by allowing the employer to cancel the contract and 
they may also sanction the breach of the promised acceptance of authority. Thus, accepting 
authority implies that the employee must carry out those actions that are preferred by the 
employer even when the costs exceed his payment for the particular action.  
  
ALIGNING DISTRIBUTED KNOWLEDGE AND TYPE II AUTHORITY 
Delegation and Type II Authority 
 Recall that Type II Authority implies that the employee has been delegated rights to make 
decisions that influence the contracting parties’ welfare. Employees to whom such discretion has 
been granted may be remunerated by fixed wages or by some kind of incentive arrangement. 
However, as the vast body of agency theory shows, a well designed incentive contract makes the 
agent act in the interest of the principal, even in the presence of asymmetric information 
concerning the agent’s actions (Holmström, 1979). In fact, incentive contracts can be used to 
allow the agent to choose actions including actions that may be unknown to the principal and 
based on knowledge that is not possessed by the agent.14 Supplier contracts may exemplify this. 
For that reason we compare two incentive contracts, a market contract and an employment 
contract.  
 Continuing with the example, assume that post contracting, Jack becomes informed about 
high-yielding, low-cost actions that are available to him. Jill knows that such actions may 
emerge. In such a setting, consider a market contract in which a bonus payment is agreed upon, 
                                                 
14 However, current formal models of agency does not allow for this.  
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such that Jack signs the contract. Jack can now freely interpret what contingencies has emerged 
and choose actions in order to maximize his benefit from the contract. However, he has 
incentives to interpret contingencies in a manner that allow him to choose the least costly actions, 
and do so at the expense of Jill. For example, if (in Table 1) contingency q emerges, Jack can 
claim that it is really contingency p, and choose action z instead of Jill’s preferred action y. The 
observed result will be 100. If there is asymmetric information between courts and the 
contracting parties regarding what contingencies have emerged, the promise may appear to be 
fulfilled according to legal standard, and Jack can get away with his cheating.  
 If instead Jill has the authority to interpret the contingencies, Jack has incentives to choose 
those actions that create the greatest surplus, given the contingency (and provided that the 
incentive compatibility constraint is met). The consequence of the asymmetric information 
between courts and contracting parties is that in the market contract setting there are more 
instances where incentive compatibility cannot be reached compared to an employment contract. 
For that reason the use of authority interpreted as the right to define the contingency may be more 
widespread with the use of incentive schemes.  
Type II Authority When Knowledge Becomes More Distributed 
 As many writers have pointed out the distributed nature of knowledge in social systems 
(from economies to firms) is closely related to, and partly prompted by, specialization (Hayek, 
1945; Arora and Gambardella, 1994). Specialization allows us to effectively handle more and 
more complex productive tasks of any kind, provided that individual actions are somehow 
aggregated to a coordinated set of actions. This coordination can take place through markets 
(negotiations among independent agents) or through the use of Type I and Type II authority. 
However, as economists have rediscovered (e.g., Romer, 1986), specialization is an ongoing 
process. So far, we have argued that authority may be efficient in handling a certain level of 
specialization and distribution of knowledge within a well defined problem; will it also be 
efficient if specialization and the attendant distribution of knowledge are increased (e.g., Coombs 
and Metcalfe, 2000; Smith, 2000; Arora and Gambardella, 1994)?  
Increasing specialization is likely to result in more interdependencies among the actions of 
different agent (Thompson, 1967), and to some agents specializing in problem-solving. For 
example, Jill knows that contingency b implies that Jack should carry out y and Will should carry 
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out v, whereas contingency q implies that Will must never carry out v. Jane knows what 
contingencies emerge, but not the implications of these contingencies, and Jack and Will know 
the actions available to them. In such a setting, Jill acts as a problem-solver or “coordinator,” 
possessing the knowledge that if Jack, Will’s and Jane’s knowledge sets are somehow 
aggregated, this will result in their having, as a “system,” a knowledge that none of them 
possesses individually and that this system of knowledge is needed in order to make efficient 
choices. Thus, although Jill-the-coordinator may still be ignorant in an important sense about the 
knowledge controlled by Jack, Will and Jane, she does not suffer from complete ignorance; there 
is some, possibly very modest, knowledge overlap. Jill may therefore be able to pass judgement 
on the overall abilities of Jack, Will and Jane, and, in particular, about how actions based on their 
knowledge may be coordinated. In other words, it is quite possible to have knowledge of types of 
interdependencies between actions based on different knowledge elements without possessing 
much knowledge of the actual interdependencies or the actions themselves (see also Spangler and 
Peters, 2001).15  
Problem Definitions and the Continuing Need for Authority  
 The question then is whether there is a link between authority and such expert 
“coordination knowledge.” If the expert has all the knowledge needed to create a perfect 
decomposition and there is no need to adapt his decision on how to decompose the problem, there 
is no need for the expert to hold authority. The expert may simply sell his knowledge on how 
problems should be decomposed or on what actions to choose given different types of 
contingencies (cf. Coase, 1937).16 However, in actual practice, the design of a problem 
                                                 
15 An illustration of the notion that “systemic” knowledge can be had without necessarily having (much) knowledge 
of individual knowledge elements may be found in the theory and practice of software development. Thus, Parnas 
(1972) develops the notion of “information hiding,” that is, the desirability in software development (particularly in 
big projects) of literally hiding information in decomposed modules and so bring interdependencies down to the 
absolute minimum.  Individual programmers ideally (!) should have very little idea about what is going on in the 
other modules. The development effort is thus of a distributed nature. However, in order to coordinate the actions of 
individual programmers a system has to be designed. In the case of software development someone must create an 
architecture, interfaces and standards that define the limits within which software programmers are allowed to 
choose among actions (i.e., types of code). An expert may possess knowledge of the structure of the software 
programming problem that enables him to define a decomposition of the overall development problem without being 
cognizant about much of what goes on in individual modules. 
16 Market exists for expert advice, although such advice as an economic good suffers from the well known problems 
in connection with markets for information. 
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architecture (Simon, 1962), including interfaces and standards, is very much a trial-and-error 
learning process (e.g., Staudenmeyer and Cusumano 1998), a process of what Egidi (1992) aptly 
calls “conjectural decomposition”: A decomposition is tried out, whether “online” or “offline,” a 
response is received, feeding back into a new conjecture, etc. Major product development 
projects that involve the problem-solving efforts of highly interdependent teams with distributed 
knowledge are usually based on such recurrent conjectural decomposition. Recent examples 
include the Boeing 777 development effort as well as Microsoft Windows (Cusumano 1997).   
 Such recurrent conjectural decomposition appears to be an activity that predominantly takes 
place within firms rather than within market relations: Firms formulate and change business plans 
and strategies; markets don’t.  Innovation, an iterative process if there is one, tends to take place 
in firms as interdependencies between the various resources and assets increase. The reason, we 
argue is that firm organization enables the use of the authority mechanism which is a low-cost 
way of governing recurrent conjectural decomposition.17  
 Governing the definition of problems. A first step in the creation of problem architectures 
is the decomposition of the problem (see Heimann, Nickerson, and Zenger, this volume). This 
requires that the problem has been made well-defined. For example, a strategic opportunity must 
be defined and made concrete by refining the business proposition and delineating its application. 
Authority is an efficient governance mechanism for promoting these processes (see also 
Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). Moreover, the way in which problems gets defined and the kind of 
constraints that are chosen will to some extent influence whether problems can be fully 
decomposed, nearly decomposed or not decomposed at all (Foss and Foss, 2006). This has 
implications for the need for authority in managing residual interdependencies, specifically for 
the understanding of Type II Authority.  
  Simon (1973: 186) forcefully argues that virtually all problems presented to problem 
solvers are, from the outset, “… best regarded as ill structured problems.  They become well 
structured problems only in the process of being prepared for the problem solvers. It is not 
                                                 
17 For the expert on system creation to acquire authority in a setting of recurrent adaptation, the expert must be the 
part who is most sensitive to decisions such as choices among different way of decomposing the problem, 
identification of what contingencies (unexpected interdependencies between modules) has emerged and what action 
(new decompositions) to take. Moreover, the system creator must have more information on important aspects of 
these decisions compared to a third party (courts), such that authority of Type II becomes the efficient way of 
organizing the system designing (cf. Simon, 1951). 
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exaggerating much to say that there are no well structured problems, only ill-structured problems 
that have been formalized for problem solvers.” Thus, well-structured problems are outcomes of 
deliberate problem-defining processes.  Defining a problem requires that constraints are imposed 
on it. Simon (1973) provides several examples of problems (relating to shipbuilding and building 
a house) that are initially extremely ill-structured, but which through the imposition of constraints 
become well-structured. A key point in his discussion is that initial choices of constraints define 
the major interdependencies in the problem-solving effort; in the sense that these constraints 
define what are the (first levels of) sub-problems and the relations between these. Not all 
constraints can be defined initially, and new constraints (around new sub-problems) arise 
endogenously in the process. The necessity of iteration between sub-problems and succeeding 
design changes, follow from the impossibility of getting the decomposition right initially (cf. 
Simon 1973: 191).18 This provides a continued role for deliberate problem-solving, and the use of 
authority in defining problem and creating architectures (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004).19   
 Governing interdependencies by means of authority. However, there may also be an 
ongoing role of authority once the problem is well defined and the corresponding architecture has 
emerged. Nickerson and Zenger (2004) assume that problems are given, and that the main 
problem is to organize the search for solutions. That is, a problem architecture has been identified 
which defines the patterns of interaction that are needed to resolve the remaining 
interdependencies between sub-problems in order for the system to adapt to changes.   
 Consider the instance where the identification and gradual definition of a business 
opportunity has resulted in the creation of an organization that is designed to produce and sell 
various goods. Adaptations within the organization require that agents adapt their actions to 
newly discovered contingencies (Williamson, 1996), implement actions not previously 
                                                 
18 The following quotation from a software developer is illustrative: A lot of time people don’t realize that they are 
dependent on something.  It’s just not obvious.  For example, you don’t realize that you have a dependency because 
you are not familiar with that part of the code.  Or a dependency just sort of materializes out of thin air because of a 
need and is tracked informally.  Or instances where the solution to one dependency creates problems for a third 
party.  The real problems arise with the hidden interdependencies – the ones that no one thought about pop up at the 
last minute” (quoted by Staudenmeyer and Cusumano 1998: 18-19). The developer goes on to stress the need for 
carefully managing the process of iteration. 
19 Given the uncertain nature of the process, the process of decomposition will almost certainly be one of trial and error 
(Egidi 2002). Grandori (1997: 37) notes that it has been “well-documented” in organization studies that “… authority is 
not very effective in managing uncertainty.” The arguments developed here imply rather the opposite.  
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recognized as solutions to problems, or restructure the system as they learn more about the 
interdependencies involved in the ongoing problem solving. These are settings in which 
according to our previous discussion Type I or II Authority may be efficient, and the exercise of 
authority may take the form of orders, the creation of job descriptions (sub-divisions of tasks), 
delegating and constraining rights to further subdivide sub-problems, and establish information 
linkages and/or incentives that will allow actions taken on the bases of distributed knowledge to 
be aggregated in way that minimize negative externalities.  
 The constraining, planning and direction that is needed ― and therefore the need for 
authority ― depend on how the business opportunity has been defined and decomposed, in 
particular what is the nature of the relevant interdependencies. If the problem has been defined 
and decomposed in a way such that only sequential interdependencies (Thompson, 1967) remain 
between sub-problems, adaptation to unexpected contingencies requires information to travel in 
one direction to ensure adaptation and agreements on adaptation only needs to be reached 
between agents engaged in adjacent activities, because that is where externalities emerge. 
Modular production systems exemplify this (Langlois, 2002). The coordination may take place 
through, for example, prices, routines, standards, the use of kanban methods, or through the use 
of authority of Type I or II. What choice of governance mechanism (and structure) is made 
depends on the determinants that are highlighted in organizational economics, notably whether 
the parties have made complementary investments and the degree of enforceability of the 
incomplete contract governing the relationship.   
 If problem identification and decomposition create a system where the remaining 
interdependencies are reciprocal (Thompson, 1967), these can be handled by means of 
communication between members of teams dealing with the relevant sub-problems. Possible 
disagreements may be handled by outside arbitration or by the use of authority. However, when 
nearly decomposable problems contain very different kinds of reciprocal interdependencies 
between sub-problems, the costs of mutual adaptation through consultation (i.e., lateral 
communication) and/or negotiations among agents may be very high. Increased specialization 
and the resulting distributed knowledge may leads to the choice of an authority-based governance 
of the adaptation process. A central agent who specializes in recognizing contingencies and in 
knowing the consequences can reduce re-negotiation costs and will acquire authority depending 
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on the specifics of the contracting situation (contractual incompleteness and enforceability, cf. 
Hart [1995] and Williamson [1996]). As more interdependencies arise between knowledge 
elements of different kinds, the margin at which authority become costly in terms of increased 
mistakes may soon be reached. However, due to the nature of the numerous interdependencies 
market contracting may not be the efficient solution. In such instances, it may instead be efficient 
to redefine the problem and create an architecture, in which many of the complex 
interdependencies are transformed to sequential interdependencies and where market contracting 
becomes efficient. However, such a redefinition of the problem may require the use of authority. 
In product development, the re-definition of product development problems and the creation of 
modular or nearly modular systems exemplify the way in which system designers can reduce 
costs of market contracting for some transactions, thus reducing the scope of transactions for 
which authority must be applied. Thus, an important function of Type II Authority is to define 
problems and to redefine sub-problems, such that at the margin the costs of making use of market 
contracts relative to authority is reduced (Langlois, 2002).   
 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Knowledge governance concerns the deployment of administrative machinery and other designable 
features of organization in order to steer processes of knowledge utilization, sharing, integration, and 
building in desired directions, that is, toward their efficient levels (Foss, 2007; chapter 1, this 
volume). This chapter has focused on the utilization of knowledge (Hayek, 1945; Garicano, 2000). 
Specifically, we have raised the issue of whether knowledge that is distributed is misaligned with the 
governance mechanism of authority in terms of efficiently utilizing that knowledge (this is how we 
interpret those management writers who claim that authority relations become strained under the 
impact of knowledge for productive purposes becoming increasingly distributed).  
 Overall, the conclusion of this chapter is that there is no apparent contradiction between the 
use of authority and the existence of distributed knowledge. This conclusion seems to be at odds 
with Hayek’s famous claim that distributed knowledge puts binding constraints on the size of an 
economic system for which central planning is feasible (Hayek, 1935, 1945). However, two 
observations seems important to the argument. First, the introduction of Type II authority allows 
for some degree of decentralization in the use of distributed knowledge and thus expands the 
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binding constraints on “central planning” as a feasible mode. Second, Hayek’s argument refers to 
the decline in the quality of planning and direction as more economic activities are subsumed 
under a central planner. Thus, it is not a matter of whether or not authority can be used at all, but 
at what scale it becomes inefficient relative to market contracting; that is, the issue is 
comparative-institutional (Williamson, 1985). The strong emphasis on the marginal limitation to 
the use of authority is also present in Coase’s (1937) analysis of the boundaries of the firm. At 
some point, he argues, the costs of managerial mistakes offset the costs of using markets as 
means of coordinating. Accordingly we should also examine the influence of increasingly 
distributed knowledge on the effective scale at which authority of Type I and II can be applied.  
However, this goes beyond the present work, the aim of which has been to contribute 
conceptually to the discussion of important notions that characterize much contemporary 
discussion of governance in the emerging knowledge economy, and to specifically argue that 
authority may very well be consistent with efficient governance under distributed knowledge 
conditions.   
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TABLE 1: Contracting Between Jack and Jill 
 
                CONTINGENCIES AND THEIR PROBABILITIES 
 
 
 
 
ACTIONS 
 Contingency p 
(p= .2) 
 
Contingency b 
(p=.6) 
Contingency q 
(p=.2) 
Y Expected benefit: 6 
Expected cost : 6 
Expected benefit: 60 
Expected cost: 12 
Expected benefit: 32 
Expected cost: 10 
Z Expected benefit: 20 
Expected cost:  10 
Expected benefit: 48 
Expected cost: 7 
Expected benefit : 20 
Expected cost: 2,2 
 
 
